

MODERNIZATION THEORY AS A CASE OF FAILED KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

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The trajectory of modernization theory, and particularly of modernization theory's explanation of democratization, is a key example of a basic problem in the production of knowledge about the social world: the failure to treat some basic matters as settled. Modernization theory was dominant in the 1950s until the mid-1960s, roundly criticized and out of favor in the 1970s and 1980s, and revived in the 1990s. Moreover, this trajectory of rise and fall and return has a prior history. The basic ideas that became known as modernization theory had been worked out by the mid-19th century and had been roundly criticized in the late 19th and early 20th century. Indeed, the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s was already a re-elaboration of old and thoroughly criticized ideas. In short, modernization theory, twice discarded and twice resurrected, is an example of the failure to make progress in the field of comparative democratization.

This cycle of fall and return does not, by itself, indicate whether the problem is due to those who discarded or those who resurrected modernization theory. However, as argued in this commentary, the case against modernization theory is strong. There are both theoretical and empirical grounds for claiming that modernization theory was discarded correctly twice, and that discarding it once again—and hopefully for good—would be a sign of scientific progress. More specifically, this claim is justified on the basis of several criteria: the consistency of modernization theory and its hypotheses with the relevant background knowledge, the fruitfulness of theorizing, the results of

empirical tests of hypotheses, and the appropriateness of the empirical tests used to assess modernization theory.

Metatheory

All theories are based on some metatheoretical ideas or general theoretical principles, which play an important role, serving as orienting principles that guide the development of middle-range theories. And such metatheoretical ideas can and should be assessed, in light of background knowledge. Thus, a point of entry into an evaluation of modernization theory is a consideration of the general theoretical principles that are distinctive of modernization theory as a school of thought.

The metatheoretical ideas of modernization theory are well-known. One is the thesis of societal and, more specifically, *economic reductionism*, that is, that political changes are explained by the domestic environment of politics, primarily by economic factors and, importantly, that political changes do not themselves shape the economy or the culture. A second is the thesis of *unilinear development*, whereby economic development, at least since the industrial revolution, is held to unfold in the same way or along a single path and to have the same political consequences all around the world.

The history of these theses is also rather well-known. They were novel when first introduced by stage theorists, such as Adam Smith in the late 18th century and Comte and Spencer in the 19th century, who addressed, if in a rather sketchy way, the origins of democracy. Moreover, they played a positive role at the time, in that they provided guidance to initial research on political change and democratization in the nascent social

sciences. However, these theses came rapidly under scrutiny and were subject to withering critiques.

The shortcomings of societal and economic reductionism were exposed by scholars such as Weber, Hintze, Pareto, and Mosca in what was a, or even the, central theoretical debate in the social sciences of the late 19th and early 20th century. As these authors argue, since political factors also affect society, the role of the state has to be considered and the relationship between politics and economics is better seen as one of reciprocal determination. Moreover, since geopolitical factors played a role, an analysis purely focused on domestic factors is also limited. In turn, the viability of diverse modes or paths of economic development, adopted by late developers due to the different position in the global economy, and the political consequences of such diverse modes of economic development, was explored by Veblen and Gerschenkron during the first decades of the 20th century. Moreover, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s a huge amount of research on the impact of the state and economic policy on society, and of the state system and the global economy, further revealed the weakness of the theses of economic reductionism and unilinear development.

Thus, the two revivals of 19th century theories under the label of modernization theory were neither innocent nor an advance in knowledge. The theorists who launched modernization theory in the 1950s in the United States, and reasserted the principles of economic reductionism and unilinear development,¹ ignored

* The following draws on Chapters 5 and 6 of a book manuscript in progress, provisionally entitled *How Advances in the Social Sciences Have Been Made: The Study of Democratization Since 1789*. This manuscript includes a full list of references

1) Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53.1 (1959): 69-105, 69; and Daniel Lerner, "Modernization. Social Aspects," In David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the*

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valuable theoretical insights developed during the first 30 to 40 years of the 20th century and hence set out to explain democracy on a weaker foundation than provided by existing theory. In turn, by the time modernization theory was relaunching in the 1990s, and these two metatheoretical theses were reasserted once more,² the inconsistency between the theoretical principles of modernization theory and the fund of existing knowledge was simply staggering. In short, particularly because the theoretical principles of modernization theory had been discarded after an explicit and careful consideration, and the basis for discarding them was so strong, the return of modernization theory was a clear setback in knowledge.

Theoretical Hypotheses

Modernization theorists have also proposed several theoretical hypotheses regarding the origins of democracy and, before turning to the results of empirical tests of these hypotheses, it is important to assess the fruitfulness of such theorizing and, once again, its consistency with background knowledge.

The core hypothesis proposed in the literature in the 1950s and 1960s is the *Lipset hypothesis*, which relates level of economic development to democracy through the growth of the

middle class and middle-class values.³ This hypothesis is pretty much a verbatim copy of a hypothesis that was, by the mid-19th century, commonplace. Many authors, including Adam Smith and Tocqueville, had argued that there is a link between certain economic changes—the rise of commerce and industry—and democracy. Furthermore, many 19th century works had specified that link, arguing that such economic changes bring about an increase in wealth and lead to an expansion of the middle class, which is the carrier of certain cultural predispositions. Thus, modernization theorists in the 1950s did not open up new areas for exploration or generate a stream of new hypotheses and thus failed to show that modernization theory was a fertile, progressive agenda of research.

However, the revised version of Lipset's hypothesis proposed by Inglehart and Welzel,⁴ the fruit of the most concerted effort to elaborate modernization theory since the collapse of communism, is even more troubling. In formulating the *Inglehart and Welzel hypothesis*, these authors introduce two significant changes to Lipset's hypothesis. First, Inglehart and Welzel revise the scope or domain of Lipset's hypothesis. Succinctly, Lipset posits that his hypothesis is relevant to cases around the globe at least since the start of the industrial era; though Lipset refers to Aristotle and thus seems to

indicate that his hypothesis should hold from the times of Ancient Greece onward, his broader discussion and indicators clearly suggest a focus on changes initiated with industrialization. In contrast, Inglehart and Welzel rather clearly suggest that the effect of economic development on democracy operates primarily since the transition to a post-industrial economy, that is, only since the 1970s.

Second, Inglehart and Welzel propose a change to the causal mechanism associated with Lipset's hypothesis, that is, the process at the level of actors through which economic development produces democratization. Lipset does not offer an elaborate discussion of any causal mechanism. But, in seeking to account for how change in the level of economic development would lead to democracy, he draws on Marx's idea of class struggle and posits that democracy is the outgrowth of a conflictual relationship between actors driven by economic interests. In contrast, Inglehart and Welzel drop any such reference to class struggle and suggest a different causal mechanism. Since Inglehart and Welzel rely on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, they posit that actors push for democracy only in a post-scarcity context, when economic needs cease to be a driving concern and post-materialist, self-expression values flourish. Moreover, since Inglehart and Welzel assume that there is a congruence between mass culture and institutions—in their terms, elites “supply” the level of democracy that the masses “demand”—they hold that democracy is generated simply by values-based mass demand for democracy, regardless of any possible resistance by elites.

The evolution from Lipset to Inglehart and Welzel is testimony to a welcome concern with theorizing. However, it cannot be considered theoretical

Social Sciences Vol. 10 (New York: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), pp. 386-95.

2) Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 48; Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 205-09; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-2, 5, 8-9, 22-25; and Christian Welzel, *Freedom Rising. Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 37-38, 48-50.

3) Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review* 53.1 (1959): 69-105. Subsequent references to Lipset are to this text.

4) Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Subsequent references to Inglehart and Welzel are to these texts.

progress. Inglehart and Welzel's revised version of Lipset's hypothesis signals a huge retreat from the earlier more ambitious claim that modernization theory offers a theory of global scope from the industrial revolution onwards, and is explicitly a concession to Barrington Moore's critique of modernization theory.⁵ In turn, the problem with the causal mechanism posited by Inglehart and Welzel is that it is inconsistent with a lot of relevant research. There is a wealth of evidence that the demand for democracy is based, at least in part, on economic interests and that actors do not only demand democracy once their material needs have been met. Moreover, there is abundant evidence that the process of democratization is a conflictual one that largely hinges on the resistance to democratization by incumbent elites or important parts of the incumbent elites, who do not "supply" democracy willingly to the extent the masses "demand."⁶

In the end, however, the most notable indictment of recent efforts to revise

5) Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21; Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

6) On the importance of economically-based demands and elite resistance in processes of democratization, see Karl de Schweinitz, *Industrialization and Democracy: Economic Necessities and Political Possibilities* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Adam Przeworski, "Conquered or Granted? A History of Franchise Extensions," *British Journal of Political Science* 39.2 (2009): 291-321; and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule," *American Political Science Review* 106.3 (2012): 495-516.

and elaborate modernization theory has come from the broader field of comparative democratization. A great amount of work has sought to empirically test modernization theory. Yet this research has, with a few exceptions, focused on Lipset's hypothesis. The lack of data on individual-level values is part of the reason. Nonetheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that modernization theorists have largely failed to convince the field of democratization studies that it has produced any new theoretical ideas that are worthy of serious consideration beyond a hypothesis already well known in the middle of the 19th century.

Empirical Tests

Turning finally to the empirical testing of modernization theory, three points bear mentioning. First, a glance at the results of quantitative tests of the Lipset hypothesis, which operationalize economic development largely but not exclusively in terms of income, reveals a rather striking pattern (see Table 1). Prior to the key work by Przeworski and Limongi in 1997,⁷ an overwhelming majority of studies confirm Lipset's hypothesis. In contrast, since 1997, the number of studies that disconfirm Lipset's hypothesis slightly outnumber those that confirm Lipset's hypothesis. Indeed, as a thorough meta-analysis of post-1997 tests concludes, this research shows that "there is *no robust effect of income on democratization*."⁸ Moreover, adding weight to the results of the more recent research, it is clearly the case that the research from 1997 onwards is more credible than the earlier research, in that it has benefited from more and better data, and an increased

7) Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49.2 (1997): 155-83

8) Troy Saghaug Broderstad, "A Meta-analysis of Income and Democracy," *Democratization* 25.2 (2018): 293-311, 294.

attention to causal inference. Thus, a preliminary conclusion is that the Lipset hypothesis, the core hypothesis of modernization theory, has been thoroughly tested and the evidence does not support modernization theory.⁹

Second, many of the tests conducted by proponents of modernization theory, or that provide support for modernization theory, rely on decisions that are rather questionable, in that they are not consistent with the theory and tend to make the test easier rather than tougher. All empirical tests of theories and even theoretical hypotheses are indirect. Indeed, all empirical tests of hypotheses rely on multiple subsidiary assumptions concerning the formulation of empirical hypotheses and the selection of indicators, and these assumptions are always more or less *ad hoc*. However, there is a concerning pattern in this literature.

Modernization theory is a global theory, that posits that economic development has the same impact on democracy around the world, and a theory that claims that the cause of democracy lies in the domestic environment of politics and is not conditional on political or international factors. In turn, Lipset argues that economic development leads to democracy in all countries, and not that economic development leads to democracy only in countries that have a certain kind of economic development or when certain

9) There has been much less testing of Inglehart and Welzel's version of modernization theory. However, all independent studies, including the recent study by Dahlum and Knutsen—which offers a methodologically superior test compared to that conducted by Inglehart and Welzel—disconfirm Inglehart and Welzel's hypothesis. Thus, research on Inglehart and Welzel's hypothesis further supports this conclusion about the Lipset hypothesis. Sirianne Dahlum and Carl Henrik Knutsen, "Democracy by Demand? Reinvestigating the Effect of Self-expression Values on Political Regime Type," *British Journal of Political Science* 47.2 (2017): 437-61.

Table 1. Quantitative Tests of the Lipset Hypothesis: A Simple Tabulation of Results

Period	Positive (as hypothesized)	Results *	
		Mixed (partly positive, partly negative)	Negative (no pattern) **
1959-1996	N: 23. Lipset (1959), Coleman (1960), Cutright (1963), Russett (1965), McCrone and Crudde (1967), Neubauer (1967), Needler (1968), Olsen (1968), Cutright and Wiley (1969), Banks (1970), Winham (1970), Flanigan and Fogelman (1971), Jackman (1973), Coulter (1975), Bollen (1979, 1980, 1983), Bollen and Jackman (1985), Pourgerami (1988), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Helliwell (1994), Muller (1995), Londregan and Pool (1996)	N: 4. Smith (1969), Dahl (1971), Soares (1987), Lipset, Seong and Torres (1993)	N: 4. Hannan and Carroll (1981), Arat (1988), Muller (1988), Hadenius (1992)
1997-2018	N: 20. Barro (1997, 1999), Coppedge (1997), Vanhanen (1997: Ch. 3), Feng and Zak (1999), Boix and Stokes (2003), Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and O'Halloran (2006), Norris (2008), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Gundlach and Paldam (2009), Boix (2011), Barro (2012), Heid, Langer and Larch (2012), Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2012), Paldam and Gundlach (2012), Benhabib, Corvalan and Spiegel (2013), Che, Lu, To and Wang (2013), Faria, Montesinos-Yufa and Morales (2014), Murtin and Wacziarg (2014), Treisman (2015)	N: 5. Glasure, Lee and Norris (1999), Heo and Tan (2001), Foweraker and Landman (2004), Kennedy (2010), Miller (2012)	N: 27. Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Bratton and van de Walle (1997: Ch. 6), Landman (1999), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000: Ch. 2), Colaresi and Thompson (2003), Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán (2003), Doorenspleet (2004, 2005: Ch. 5), Hadenius and Teorell (2005), Milanovic (2005), Rudra (2005), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008, 2009), Houle (2009), Persson and Tabellini (2009), Przeworski (2009), Teorell (2010), Alemán and Yang (2011), Alexander, Harding and Lamarche (2011), Hegre, Knutsen and Rød (2012), Fayad, Bates and Hoeffler (2012), Gassebner, Lamla and Vreeland (2013), Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán (2013), Haggard and Kaufman (2016), Rosenfeld (2017), Broderstad (2018), Knutsen, Gerring, Skaaning, Teorell, Maguire, Coppedge and Lindberg (2018)

Note: (*) These results are largely the summary results reported by the authors. (**) The one exception is the Fayad, Bates and Hoeffler (2012) study, which finds the opposite of what Lipset hypothesized rather than no pattern.

political or international conditions hold. However, many tests of the Lipset hypothesis that yield a positive result rely on choices that clearly deviate from modernization theory and Lipset's hypothesis. For example, tests routinely drop oil exporting countries from their analysis or control for factor endowments such as oil, suggesting that such an exclusion is justified because oil might have a "negative impact ... on democratic transitions."¹⁰

Along similar lines, several authors have tested the impact of economic

development on democracy conditional on the ideology of rulers or the global political order, factors that are not only not part of modernization theory but run counter to its metatheoretical ideas. Thus, its reliance on advanced methods notwithstanding, some recent empirical research on the Lipset hypothesis is flawed. In many instances, researchers seem more intent on saving than testing modernization theory.

More broadly, researchers fail to recognize the big difference between the original Lipset hypothesis and the hypotheses that many tests consider. It is one thing to test the hypothesis

that economic development leads to democratization through its impact on class structure and certain values. It is a rather different thing to test the hypothesis that economic development leads to democratization *if* economic development brings about some changes in the class structure and/or the values of societal actors, particularly when the *conditions* accounting for the impact of economic development on the key intervening variables of class structure and distribution of values are extraneous to or even incompatible with modernization theory. Indeed, the hypotheses that are tested in many studies that provide support for

10) Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," *World Politics* 55.4 (2003): 517-49, 535.

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modernization theory are one more sign of the retreat from early claims of modernization theory and yet another major concession to critics of modernization theory.

Third, and relatedly, it is noteworthy that several recent studies that claim to offer support for modernization theory actually yield results that are problematic for the theory. One study argues that modernization theory is supported even though it finds that the impact of economic development on democratization “varies across income levels and across eras” and is “weak or nonexistent after World War Two.”¹¹ Going further, a recent study claims to support modernization theory by showing that an increase in the level of economic development decreases the likelihood of regime change—but increases the probability that, if there is regime change, it will be in the direction of democracy. That is, this study ignores that modernization theory posits that economic development makes a prediction both about regime change and the direction of regime change. Yet, rather oddly, the author suggests that it is the critics of modernization theory that suffer from “a fundamental misconception” that prevents them from recognizing that this finding does *not* “contradict modernization theory.”¹² Finally, scholars fail to recognize that tests showing that the impact of economic development on democracy is conditional on political and international factors should be read as offering support for alternatives to modernization theory, which explicitly criticized modernization theory for its

failure to address the role of political and/or international factors.¹³ That is, adding to other problems in the testing of modernization theory, some scholars draw implications from the results of their tests in dubious ways and overstate the case for modernization theory.

In sum, with several decades of research to draw on—it is not a stretch to claim that the Lipset hypothesis is one of the most tested hypotheses in the field of comparative politics—we are in a position to conclude that the evidence runs mainly against modernization theory. Or, put more categorically, it strains credulity to posit that further testing is likely to tilt the evidence strongly in favor of modernization theory and hence that modernization theory deserves more time to prove its empirical validity. Indeed, it is fair to argue that the payoff from recent empirical research is steadily declining and to insist that the lack of robust confirmation of the Lipset hypothesis is much more than a tentative finding.

Conclusion

We lack a protocol for deciding, as a community of scholars, when a theory should be discarded. And a decision to discard a theory, a research tradition, or a body of literature, should be made deliberately and cautiously. Indeed, the history of the social sciences is full of cases in which important knowledge has been rejected, forgotten or abandoned. However, as argued at the outset, discarding modernization theory once and for all would be a sign of scientific progress.

Modernization theory is a failed theory. It faces major theoretical and empirical

weaknesses. Moreover, it ceased to be productive a long time ago. Indeed, it is a degenerative program, in that its proponents have largely neglected to propose new ideas and open up new areas for research; increasingly retreated from earlier claims, explicitly or implicitly making concessions to critics of modernization theory; and regularly opted to lower rather than raise the bar in their empirical tests. Thus, the costs of any further investment of resources (e.g. research time, research funds, journal space) in modernization theory should be recognized.

Various alternatives to modernization theory show considerable promise and time is better spent developing and testing these theories. Important priorities are the reformulation of a political economy of distributive conflict in a way that avoids the pitfalls of the unrealistic medium voter model, the systematization of the scattered yet useful ideas about the impact of non-democratic regimes, and the launching of an agenda on the nexus between the multi-faceted problematic of the state and democracy that avoids the cul-de-sac of arguments about prerequisites. More broadly, greater attention should be given to theories that link macro- and micro-levels of analysis, address the impact of distal and proximate causes, and explore the possibility of multiple paths to democracy.

In short, it is time to draw a collective conclusion about modernization theory. The field of comparative democratization should act on the considerable signs that modernization theory is a failed theory, set it aside, and move on to more promising avenues of research.

11) Carles Boix, “Democracy, Development and the International System,” *American Political Science Review* 105.4 (2011): 809-28, 809, 820.

12) Ryan Kennedy, “The Contradiction of Modernization: A Conditional Model of Endogenous Democratization,” *Journal of Politics* 72.3 (2010): 785-98, 785, 788.

13) Carles Boix, “Democracy, Development and the International System,” *American Political Science Review* 105.4 (2011): 809-28; Michael K. Miller, “Economic Development, Violent Leader Removal, and Democratization,” *American Journal of Political Science* 56.4 (2012): 1002-20; and Daniel Treisman, “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover,” *American Journal of Political Science* 59.4 (2015): 927-42.

SECTION NEWS

Bustikova, Lenka (Arizona State University) has assumed the responsibility of editor of *East European Politics*, www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs21.

Carlin, Ryan, Jonathan Hartlyn, Timothy Hellwig, Gregory J. Love, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, and Matthew M. Singer “Public Support for Latin American Presidents: The Cyclical Model in Comparative Perspective,” *Research & Politics*, July-Sept. 2018: 1-8, available at: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2053168018787690>. The article examines presidential approval in 18 Latin American countries and relies on data from the executive approval project database, available at: <http://www.executiveapproval.org/>

David, Roman, *Communists and Their Victims: The Quest for Justice in the Czech Republic*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018, <http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15813.html>

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz, *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Gellman, Mneesha, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emerson College, has published “Democratization and Memories of Violence: Ethnic Minority Rights Movements in Mexico, Turkey, and El Salvador.” (2017)

Hanley, Sean and Milada Anna Vachudova (2018). “Understanding the illiberal turn: backsliding in the Czech Republic,” *East European Politics*, Vol. 34, No 3, pp. 276-296.

Javeline, Debra, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, has published, “Coastal Homeowners in a Changing Climate,” in *Climatic Change* (with engineer **Tracy Kijewski-Correa**). The article is part of a forthcoming edited special issue on “Adapting to Water Impacts of Climate

Change” that Javeline is co-editing with Aseem Prakash and Nives Dolsak.

J. Chin, John, a post-doctoral fellow with the Institute for Politics and Strategy at Carnegie Mellon University, has recently published an article published in the *Journal of Chinese Political Science* that may be of interest to section members: “[The Longest March: Why China’s Democratization Is Not Imminent](#)”.

Kadivar, Mohammad Ali. 2018. “Mass Mobilization and the Durability of New Democracies.” *American Sociological Review* 83(2):390–417.

Kadivar, Mohammad Ali and Neil Ketchley. 2018. “Sticks, Stones, and Molotov Cocktails: Unarmed Collective Violence and Democratization.” *Socius* 4:2378023118773614.

Muñoz, Paula, (2018), *Buying Audiences. Clientelism and Electoral Campaigns When Parties are Weak*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Niedzwiecki, Sara (2018): *Uneven Social Policies. The Politics of Subnational Variation in Latin America*: Cambridge University Press.

Nikolayenko, Olena, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Fordham University, published “Why Women Protest: Insights from Ukraine’s EuroMaidan” (co-authored with Maria DeCasper), in *Slavic Review*, vol. 77 (Fall 2018). She received the 2018 APSA Small Research Grant to conduct additional research on women’s engagement in a revolution.

Puerta-Riera, Maria, Associate Faculty, Political Science. Valencia College, Orlando, U.S.A. Puerta-Riera, Maria “Venezuela: The Decline of a Democracy”, *Development*, 60(3), 174-179 (Available at: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41301-018-0157-6>) DOI: 10.1057/s41301-018-0157-6

In a recently published article, entitled ‘Marketing parliament: The constitutive effects of external attempts at parliamentary strengthening in Jordan’, Dr. **Benjamin Schuetze** (postdoctoral research fellow, University of Freiburg) explores the reconfiguration of authoritarian rule in Jordan via external intervention in the name of democracy. The article is part of a special issue on the topic of ‘Decentring the study of international interventions’ and has appeared with *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2018.

Siroky, David recently received the Deil S. Wright Best Paper Award from the American Political Science Association (Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations Section), at the 2018 annual convention in Boston, for his paper “The Limits of Indirect Rule: Containing Nationalism in Corsica” (co-authored with **Sean Mueller, Michael Hechter** and **Andre Fazi**). The Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, France, has extended a fellowship to him in support of his work on Corsican nationalism.

Solingen, Etel. 2018 National Academy of Sciences, William and Katherine Estes Award, recognizing basic research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that uses rigorous formal and empirical methods to advance our understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war <http://www.nasonline.org/programs/awards/2018/Solingen.html>

Solingen, Etel. Nuclear Proliferation: The Risks of Prediction.” *Oxford Handbook of International Security*. Edited by Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth (2018).

Solingen, Etel and Peter Gourevitch, “Domestic Coalitions: International Sources and Effects.” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*, edited by William R. Thompson (2017).

Solingen, Etel and Wilfred Wan, “International Security: Critical Junctures, Developmental Pathways, and Institutional